Does anyone know if it would be legal to have a privately funded and controlled nuclear reactor in space? For example, if Burt Rutan were to construct a craft in orbit that was powered by a nuke, would there be anything illegal about it?
If we are going to colonize space -- meaning, civilians living in space -- eventually we are going to need nuclear powered private vehicles (non-NASA, non-USAF, non-USN), unless somebody invents batteries that can operate in the cold enviornment.
--Brian (former US Navy Trident submariner (sonar tech))
No, there would be nothing illegal about having a privately-owned nuke reactor in space, as far as I know.
The problem would be getting it up there..... a BIG PROBLEM !
Right now the political & regulatory environment is such that even a big national outfit like NASA is going to have to jump through about half-a-million hoops to get any reactor (such as Prometheus) into orbit. They will need an army of lawyers and regulatory compliance technical geeks to get it through the bureaucracy.
Just for starters, no private company can build or own reactors that are not LEU - Low-enriched uranium -- i.e. below 20% U-235.
But for reasons of lightness, most space reators use HEU (including Prometheus), the kind that's also used in bombs. No chance you could build one of those -- not even if your name is Burt Rutan.
A reactor using 19.5% U-235 won't be THAT MUCH heavier -- but it also won't be the absolute optimum.
Then there are all the political hurdles of flying anything even mildly radioactive.....
It might be more productive to beat your head against a wall....
I would have to agree--civillian HEU (highly enrinched uranium) reactors may be very difficult to do, but the benefits higher power-to-weight ratio outweigh the negatives of a natural uranium reactor. Not to say natural or low enrichment reactors won't have their places--I'm sure that large settlements on Mars, the Moon, and the asteroids (and beyond) will all benefit from nuclear power. Eventually when people begin to permanently settle these places, then the demand for a steady, independent power supply becomes necessary--and nuclear power will be ideal power source for all deep space settlements and missions.
Nearer term, it is my belief that serious consideration should be given to utilizing cargo variants of man-rated space boosters to transport fueled nuclear-reactors, such as the SP-100 and similar systems. Weight penalties asside, the advantages of utilizing a robust capsule with an independent reentry heat shield, parachute and launch escape system should not be ignored. Although the added complexities of ferrying up a nuclear power pack for docking with a JIMO vehicle, as an example, will definately be significant, the ability to safely recover an intact (and possibly even undamaged) reactor in the event of a launch abort or even in an abort-to-orbit scenario cannot be ignored. Thus I feel strongly that the added expense of robust, man rated or similar capsule hardware systems is justified when launching nuclear reactors into space.
Larger reactors, such as the Pratt and Whitney Triton could be ferried up using something like the now defunct Assured Crew Return Vehicle, a minishuttle. The ability to have flexible abort modes should be considered when transporting fueled reactor assemblies. If this route were chosen, then perhaps this could go a long way in addressing the Publics Fears regarding space nuclear power systems.
I agree with what everyone else has written. I would also add to the regulatory uncertainty problems of licensing civilian spacecraft reactors what NRC Commissioner Jeffrey Merrfield spoke on at the March 8, 2005 Regulatory Information Conference in Washington, DC. For relatively benign proposed commercial land-based reactors such as the Pebble bed or General Atomics HGTR, or liquid metal fast breeders, the NRC doesn’t even have a part of 10 CFR 50 devoted to it. The whole focus of the regulator has been on light water cooled and moderated, electric power generating reactors. I can’t even begin to imagine what the Code of Federal Regulations would look like, or how thick the licensing documentation would be for a NERVA. And while Commissioner Merrifield doesn’t even mention spacecraft reactors, he does touch on advanced reactor designs that are not light water cooled and moderated, and essentially says that it’ll take a very long time (i.e., a decade or more) and a lot of money to license. Read on….
The first lesson that we should pay heed to is the pitfall of too much innovation. I have had the opportunity to attend a number of conferences where papers have been presented about revolutionary technologies that would dramatically change the way nuclear power is produced today. Whether it is liquid metal, sodium, or high temperature, gas-cooled reactors, the proponents of these technologies, along with many of their supporters in research and academia, sometimes fail to remember the principle purpose of nuclear power plants–providing a predictable, reliable and safe way of turning on the lights.
I equate this behavior to automobile aficionados who drool over the concept cars introduced at local auto shows–entranced by the possibilities presented by the creative use of design, engineering, materials, and science. These vehicles frequently incorporate new, conceptual, or untested technologies, that may or may not represent the future. Yet, despite the allure of these new designs, those who actually purchase vehicles, the American consumers, have made the Ford F-150 pickup and the Toyota Camry the #1 selling vehicles in their respective classes. It seems common sense to me, that like the American public, industry executives and their Wall Street partners who will be in the driver’s seat when it comes to future plant orders, will want a product that reliably fulfills its purpose in a predicable way. I doubt that they want the nuclear equivalent of a concept vehicle.
Now, before anyone accuses me of rejecting innovation, I will profess that I am an avid lover of technology. Just ask the IT folks at the NRC. I believe that innovations in technology are critically important in advancing the safety of our reactors, but I believe it is advisable that these changes should be made in an evolutionary, not a revolutionary way. While the use of innovative designs may pave the way for the future, public acceptance of these designs will take research and development, time, and a willingness to engage in a meaningful dialogue on their potential features and risks. Unlike the widespread adoption of innovative electronic devices like personal digital assistants or MP-3 players, the American public is much more wary of experimental designs when it comes to nuclear facilities.
Be Wary of Over-promising and Overreaching
The second pitfall that must be avoided is the tendency to over-promise or overreach in describing the capabilities and risks associated with nuclear technologies. We have all heard the quote from Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1954, that in the future, electricity from nuclear power will be "too cheap to meter." This statement has been all too frequently thrown back at the industry by those critical of the high costs associated with building and operating the nuclear fleet in the 1980's and 1990's. While I am sure Chairman Strauss believed this at the time and intended for it to reassure the American public about the usefulness of nuclear power, the fact remains that it is this overzealous one-liner that people are still reminded of today.
From the standpoint of a safety regulator, the promise that nuclear power plants would not be subject to a major accident has also sadly been proven wrong on more than one occasion. C. G. Suits, the director of research for General Electric, in Congressional testimony dating to 1955, stated that the chances of a severe accident were "extremely improbable." Given such statements, it is not surprising that Three Mile Island came as such a shock to the American public. When it comes to nuclear safety, we should only promise that which can realistically be delivered.
Similarly, today there are promises that some of the technologies under consideration are not subject to fuel melting, and thus, do not require 10 mile emergency evacuation zones as is required of currently operating reactors. While in concept this may be appealing to some proponents, I think it is unrealistic to expect that reductions in the current emergency planning requirements would be met with widespread acceptance by the majority of the American public, as well as Congress. While other technologies which envision using innovative designs to produce both energy as well as hydrogen may show some promise, one cannot dismiss the safety considerations associated with large amounts of volatile hydrogen being produced in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant. Finally, many of these new designs promise improvements in fuel efficiency and fuel disposal. Notwithstanding the uncertainties associated with the permanent disposition of our current fuel types, new technologies, with new and more complex fuels may further complicate an already difficult policy challenge. Before we can even begin to think how we would regulate these new reactors, we need to understand and quantify the myriad of policy decisions that we may yet face.
Be Wary of the Burden You Place On Regulators
The third lesson I would encourage you to consider is placing too much of a burden on the regulator. With three early site permits under review, a variety of consortiums and individual companies intending to submit combined license applications, and a multitude of vendors seeking certification of their plant designs, we have a significant amount of work on our regulatory plate. For those reactor designs of a traditional pressurized or boiling water type, the workload will be considerable, but it will also be predictable due to the vast experience we have obtained in the 30+ years we have been licensing and regulating these designs. This cannot be said for advanced gas cooled reactors, pebble bed reactors, so-called nuclear batteries, or even pressurized heavy water reactors. All of these technologies will take significant time and resources for our staff to be able to license and regulate, despite some of the promises being made by their proponents. Further, unlike PWR and BWR technologies, we do not have readily available facilities to independently verify the claims made by the vendors.
I recently gave a speech in which I defended the NRC as being a more predictable regulator than in times past. And I firmly believe this is true. Predictability is a two way street, however, and our predictability can be seriously challenged when we are dealing with unpredictable licensees. I would urge the industry to do as much advanced planning as possible and to provide us with concrete information upon which to make regulatory decisions. As a fiscal conservative, I need more than a flashy Power Point presentation before I can commit FTE to a proposed project. Despite our best intentions, we have been set back in the past when we committed significant resources to pre-review activities for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor and the ACR-700 designs, only to have these projects subsequently withdrawn or delayed. With this in mind, it is my opinion that when planning how to utilize our limited agency resources, the NRC should focus its time and effort on those projects that have the greatest likelihood of resulting in real reactor orders.
As a regulator, I would be more comfortable expending resources on reactor design reviews if the Department of Energy and the industry could clarify which designs they will seek to certify. If there are vendors and utilities who wish for us to review non-traditional designs, we have an obligation to do so. We also have an obligation to the public to do a thorough analysis and review of any such designs. For this reason, potential applicants with non-light water designs should not expect that we will be able to conduct our reviews with the speed and efficiency in which we recently reviewed the AP-1000. The cost and time associated with reviewing non-light water designs could be significantly more extensive. In addition, at a time when we are faced with a potential bow-wave of new reactor orders, instituting a major effort to figure out how to regulate non-light water technologies may be pushing the bounds of what this Agency can reasonably handle. If the industry wants to jump start new reactor orders, it needs to understand how all of these pieces fit together.
Be Mindful of What Has Already Been Accomplished
The fourth consideration I will leave you with is that despite these warnings, I believe that we must also be mindful of what has been accomplished in the way of design and safety enhancements. Today, there are a number of advanced light water designs that have been proposed and built; some that we have licensed, and some that we have not. All of them have features that bring with them significant advancements in safety when compared with the designs that have their origins in the 1960's. As a safety regulator, it would be inappropriate for me to promote these reactors or their sale, yet, it would also be irresponsible not to recognize the basic fact that these designs incorporate considerable improvements in technology and safety. We know this having reviewed a number of these designs over the last ten years. As regulators, we want to see innovative changes to tried and true designs and technology.
Like a car owner looking for a reliable, predictable and safe vehicle, those who might wish to order a nuclear power plant need to weigh the positives and negatives associated with each design. Despite what the salesman says, the most cutting edge technologies don’t always represent the right choice.
Wow, thanks very much for the informative post. I always knew that you folks were busy--and with the potential flood of applicants for new reactor licenses, the NRC is definately going to have its work cut out for you. Thanks again for taking the time to post here!
So if I understand what you said correctly, then licensing of space power reactors and potential NTR (Nuclear Thermal Rocket) reactors, atleast those flown by the United States, will fall under the NRC's licensing jurisdiction. No real surprise there, I suppose.
And if I also understand correctly, that with the potential work back log, then licensing of such reactors may be a problem because of their level of innovation and the relative unfamiliarity (or operating history might be more accurate) of the industry to such technology. I certainly understand that. Unfortunately, to demonstrate things like safety, failure modes, and gain operational experience, it will probably be necessary to build several such devices, and then test/demonstrate them--which of course requires licensing...
Is there a provision for licensing the testing of potentially cutting edge nuclear technology within the NRC? I understand that the NRC primarily deals with light water reactors--this is the world standard for civillian nuclear power production--but these are closed cycle units. Whereas an NTR would of course be an open cycle unit by definition, do you think that with proper fascilities (such as a large high-altitude-simulating NTR rocket test stand and exhaust scrubber fascility) that the NRC might grant a test license, if a detailed proposal were made?
I am familiar with NRC's and Commissioner Jeffrey Merrfield's views (to some extent, anyway), but this stuff is SPECIFICALLY INTENDED FOR COMMERCIAL POWER PLANTS, not space reactors, or university research & training reactors (moderated by zirconium hydride, in the case of TRIGA's, BTW), laboratory critical assemblies (thermal or fast neutron), or marine reactors, nuke rockets, or what have you.
There is a HUGE difference: reactors running for years-on-end at ~3000 megawatts thermal power create waaaay more fission products than little reactors that aren't even switched 'on' during launch.
I agree with you. However, who would license US nuclear propulsion reactors for use in civilian spacecraft if NOT the US NRC? While it's true that Commissioner Merrifield was primarily discussing the licensing of commercial reactors for electricity production, his words of advice would be equally true for licensing spacecraft propulsion reactors. Accident scenarios and environmental considerations would be totally different, but they would still exist. Indeed, both these things would be extremely important to certify public health and safety when lofting a reactor into orbit before it is first used. True, radiological release during propulsion operation in deep space is a non-issue, but crew radiation exposure from reactor operation is something to consider (but perhaps outweighed by the far greater exposure that occurs from ambient radiation fields in deep space, especially during sunspot activity).
I am no expert in this field, but licensing a spacecraft nuclear reactor would be a whole new field, whether for the US NRC or some other government body. But space craft nuclear reactors will indeed be licensed and regulated.
"NRC's primary mission is to protect public health and safety and the environment from the effects of radiation from nuclear reactors, materials, and waste facilities."
Of course this will be an issue on reactor liftoff, and perhaps even a crew radiation exposure issue throughout reactor operation. (Some would argue that the crew is still a part of the public, even if separated by several AU from Earth.) This will sadly take big government years and years and lots of tax dollars to figure out (remember - the lure of spending tax dollars alone is sufficient justification to expand the powers of any government agency, even the US NRC and it is better than most).
NUREG-1537 - Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, contains the guidance which the NRC uses to administer the Reactor Licensing Process
The following web page gives a list of such reactors regulated by the US NRC.
I apologize to all for posting four messages in one day, but I just realized that NRC Chairman Diaz before his appointment to the US NRC was the Director of the Innovative Nuclear Space Power Institute (INSPI). Read his biography at:
I think he was involved in some 'original' work on nuclear-electric propulsion drives back in the early 1990s before Clinton appointed him. If anyone knows about licensing issues for spacecraft nuclear reactors, it'll be him.
It appears that the applicable NRC regulations are NUREG-1537 - Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors.
It consists of two large pdf documents :
NUREG 1537, Part 1 - Guidelines for Preparing & Reviewing Applications for Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, Format and Content.
NUREG-1537, Part 2, "Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Application for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors. Standard Review Plan and Acceptance Criteria."
NUREG 1537, Part 1 - "Guidelines for Preparing & Reviewing Applications for Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, Format and Content" is NRC ADAMS Accession Number ML042430055.
NUREG-1537, Part 2 - "Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Application for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors. Standard Review Plan and Acceptance Criteria" is NRC ADAMS Accession Number ML042430048.
For some reason, the PDF files for both documents are currently unavailable. However, if you click on the links (shown below) just to the right of the PDF icons for the respective parts of the NUREG in the NRC ADAMS Library, then a text printout of the NUREG files will appear in a somewhat distorted shape, but all the relevant technical discussion should be present:
I have so far obtained no return hits for key words such as space craft, space ship, rocket, etc., in either document. I am continuing to look for NRC documents germane to licensing space craft nuclear propulsion systems, but because the field is so new and unique, I doubt I will find any. NASA's Project Prometheus will probably be the first (assuming that it is actually ever done and I think it got cancelled - but I may be wrong). I am at a loss as to explain how thermal isotopic generators got licensed, but perhaps some special dispensation was done to exempt them from NRC requirements given that only NASA and the military would be using them, or maybe I am looking at the wrong place in the NRC ADAMS Library. Rest assurred that any civilian use of special nuclear material (U-233, U-235, Pu-239) will indeed be regulated by the NRC, whether for space craft propulsion, electric generation, ship propulsion, etc.
BTW, a NUREG is NOT a regulation. NRC Regulations are only those that appear in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. These are "Requirements binding on all persons and organizations who receive a license from NRC to use nuclear materials or operate nuclear facilities". See the following web page for links to the NRC CFR's:
NUREGs are "Reports or brochures on regulatory decisions, results of research, results of incident investigations, and other technical and administrative information."
There are more documents such as Reg. Guides. "The Regulatory Guide series provides guidance to licensees and applicants on implementing specific parts of the NRC's regulations, techniques used by the NRC staff in evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the staff in its review of applications for permits or licenses."
Commission Papers (SECY): Written issue papers the NRC staff submits to the Commission for Commission decision and information about policy, rulemaking, and adjudicatory matters (1996 to present).
Commission Action Memoranda (COMs): COMs may be (1) written exchanges among Commissioners on issues before the agency or on matters a Commissioner wants to bring to the attention of his or her follow Commissioners or (2) memoranda from the NRC staff seeking guidance from the Commission. Using COMs allows Commissioners to develop preliminary views, explore options and propose direction to the staff, and to initiate activities before staff offices become involved (1996 to present).
Staff Requirements Memoranda (SRMs): After the Commission completes its vote on a written issue paper submitted by the NRC staff, the Office of the Secretary records the decision in a "Staff Requirements Memorandum" (SRM). The SRM includes a concise statement of the Commission's decision on the recommendation of the paper, noting specifically any approved modifications to the recommendations. The SRM also contains a clear statement of any additional requirements or tasks to be performed by the staff together with appropriate action due dates (1996 to present).
Commission Voting Record (CVR): After the Commission completes its vote on a written issue paper submitted by the NRC staff (SECY) and the SRM has been issued, the Office of the Secretary will issue a CVR that includes (a) an indication of affirmative votes, negative votes, abstentions, non-participation, and individual views of all Commissioners; (b) a copy of each Commissioner's vote sheet; (c) a comment resolution section indicating the extent to which differing views, if any, as expressed in the individual vote sheets, were accommodated, resolved, and reflected in the final decision; and (d) a copy of the final SRM (1997 to present).
Commission Meeting Transcripts: Transcripts of Commission meetings organized by date of meeting and associated SRM (1996 to present).
Commission Orders: The Commission has supervisory authority over the conduct of adjudicatory proceedings of the Atomic Safety Licensing Board Panel. In a Commission Order, the Commission may review a panel's memorandum and order, reverse a ruling of the panel, rule on a petitioner's request to intervene in a proceeding, grant a petitioner additional time to prepare for a proceeding, or review certain issues involved in a proceeding (1999 to present).
Commission Speeches: Speeches of individual Commissioners at various meetings and events in the United States and abroad (1997 to present).
Commission Correspondence: Important Commission correspondence to Congress and others concerning NRC activities.
Licensing civilian space craft nuclear reactors will take decades of effort and billions of dollars should US private citizens or corporations (as is far more likely) ever be allowed to own and pilot such crafts. The documentation involved is momumental. For example, just to extend the operating license of a typical pressurized water reactor for electricity production such as Turkey Point in Florida, 7000 pages of public comments had to be resolved by the US NRC, and millions of dollars were spent by FP&L. I can't begin to imagine the comments that would be engendered by launching a privately owned space craft nuclear reactor into orbit. WISE, NIRS, NCI, Greenpeace, CAN and all the rest of the anti-nukes would be in an uproar, and the cost that would be incurred on the part of those seeking a license would be monumental. The licensing process allows the public to make comments and those comments have to be responded to - that's the 'curse' of living in a republic - but better that than North Korea.
This is certainly an aspect of nuclear propulsion which has not been addressed before on this site. Certainly breaking new ground and making progress will require sustained effort, and not doubt billions of dollars all around.
I would like to ask though, how were the licensing issues handled during Project Rover and Project NERVA? I understand that some of these tests were actually conducted in open air at the Nevada Test Site in 1969, well after the Limited Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963. Was ROVER and NERVA completely under the auspicies of the US DOD or did the DOE have over riding jursidiction?
The licensing for KIWI and NERVA in the 1960s was done by the predecessor to the NRC which was the AEC. The AEC got broken up into DOE and the NRC in 1974. See the governing legislation at:
"This Act established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, a single agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, had responsibility for the development and production of nuclear weapons and for both the development and the safety regulation of the civilian uses of nuclear materials. The Act of 1974 split these functions, assigning to one agency, now the Department of Energy, the responsibility for the development and production of nuclear weapons, promotion of nuclear power, and other energy-related work, and assigning to the NRC the regulatory work, which does not include regulation of defense nuclear facilities. The Act of 1974 gave the Commission its collegial structure and established its major offices. The later amendment to the Act also provided protections for employees who raise nuclear safety concerns."
The Office of Naval Reactors have always been exempt from NRC oversight. The NRC oversees civilian uses of special nuclear material, not military. If a nuclear powered military space craft were going to be built for the US Air Force (for example), then I would imagine that its regulation would be similar to what's done for the US Navy via Naval Reactors. See the following web page which explains that the National Nuclear Security Administration administers the Office of Naval Reactors:
In like manner there would probably be an Office of Air Force Reactors, too. But this office would never provide oversight of civilian space craft reactors - that would still be done by the US NRC.
BTW, you can find the complete history of the US NRC and how it evolved at the following web page:
All the answers are out there - but all the answers involves tons of tax dollars.
Lastly, I am aware of these things because between the US Navy and commercial nuclear power plants I have 29 years of nuclear-related experience. I started out as a submarine reactor operator, left the navy for a commercial pressurized water reactor after my six year hitch, became an I&C tech, then an I&C instructor, then a Radiation Monitoring System Engineer. I transferred to a Boiling Water Reactor where I worked as a digital design engineer. I am now in the Plant Process Computer Group. I have written 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations (also called Nuclear Safety Evaluations), developed major digital upgrade modifications, and worked on a variety of licensing issues to upgrade radiation monitoring, security computer, plant process computer, and miscellaneous instrument and control systems. I can tell you from personal experience that licensing issues for conventional nuclear power plants are exasperating enough and involve reams and reams of paperwork as well as hundreds of hours of mind-numbing analysis. I can't begin to imagine what licensing issues would be like for a space craft nuclear reactors.
P.S. From personal experience - The Office of Naval Reactors is tougher than the US NRC. But that's just my perception.
Well there you go -- I'm Canadian, and we only license CANDUs, Maples and Slowpokes (plus NRU, MNR, and some critical assemblies).
Thanks for the great info.
How about the original question -- flying materials & components into orbit, and then assembling a reactor out in "no man's land," so to speak ? (assumes you'd have to do all your testing there too... )
You're welcome. It's not often I get to have an intelligent conversation about things nuclear with people outside the US nuclear industry who actually understand the issues.
The original question posed by Neutrino78x to this forum was, "Does anyone know if it would be legal to have a privately funded and controlled nuclear reactor in space? For example, if Burt Rutan were to construct a craft in orbit that was powered by a nuke, would there be anything illegal about it?"
The answer is that for United States civilians, there is no process to license the use of special nuclear material for space craft nuclear propulsion. The US government agency that regulates ALL civilian use of nuclear material (for example, this includes medical uses as well - see 10 CFR 35 at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part035/) is the US NRC. It has developed no part to Title 10 (Energy) of the Code of Federal Regulations to license special nuclear material for use in space craft because there is no public demand for it. Therefore, without this part to Title 10 it is ILLEGAL for US civilians to have, own or use space craft nuclear reactors (but this is a moot point because no civilian has the money to design and build one - only the the US government does and it would do that in the same way that it does Naval Reactors - bypass the whole system).
As for your query, "How about the original question -- flying materials & components into orbit, and then assembling a reactor out in 'no man's land,' so to speak ? (assumes you'd have to do all your testing there too...", the special nuclear material and reactor assembly parts still have to be obtained, fabricated on and lifted off from Earth (presumably US territory). If so, then licensing by the US NRC still applies. Questions such as what prevents inadvertent criticality during lift-off, what prevent radiological release on a lift-off abort, what security provisions exist to prevent diversion of special nuclear material into the wrong hands, how is crew radiation exposure controlled / limited over time, what prevents radiological release on accidental re-entry, etc., etc., ad nauseam would have to be answered. Even flying the parts up into orbit and assembling them there engenders some risk (however miniscule) that licensing review would have to answer. Additionally, since orbital assembly can affect any area on Earth if accidental re-entry occurs, I could even see the IAEA getting involved from a licensing perspective. The IAEA's web page is at:
The dice are stacked against civilian ownership of space craft nuclear reactors. Only a big corporation would have the financial resources to try. I sometimes think this is deliberate so that only government would have nuclear propulsion capability. But maybe I am a bit too paranoid.....
BTW, the CANDU is a smart design. For example, theoretically it can take spent fuel from US light water reactors and burn it up (so to speak) with minimal reprocessing, and make the whole Yucca Mountain issue another moot point. And on-line refueling is a very smart move. But two problems plague CANDUs: tritium (heavy water is an excellent moderator, but its use engenders a lot more tritium than evolves out of US light water reactors), and required maintenance / replacement of refueling machinery due to the deleterious effects of long term radiation exposure (that's a materials problem from neutron and gamma exposure).
P.S. From personal experience - The Office of Naval Reactors is tougher than the US NRC. But that's just my perception. Regards, Paul P.
Would you expect the same tough licensing procedures to apply in the case of unmanned Navy vessels ? ....specifically, ones that don't have a vulnerable human crew, like submarines or surface ships.... and, just as importantly, ones that don't even operate in the earth's biosphere ? (as in spacecraft).
Looking at somewhat analogous comparisons in the aerospace world, I note that the turbofan engines of cruise missiles and UCAVs are nowhere nearly as expensive (read 'safe') as those used on passanger airliners or military troop transport jets.
Even ground testing of space reactors can (and has been) carried out remotely -- i.e. without endangering human life in case of malfunction.
As for just the materials transportation (to orbit) aspects of this business, we all know of course that U-235 is far less radioactive than the Pu-238 in RTGs.....
Yours are good questions. I would expect the licensing process for unmanned civilian nuclear powered space craft to be less rigorous than manned.
As you correctly pointed out, per unit mass U-235 is less radioactive (by far) than Pu-238; however, the issue of preventing inadvertent criticality on lift-off would still have to be addressed, and the obstructionist anti-nukes would get their turn in the necessary public comment period.
When I was in the US navy more than two decades ago, there were no unmanned nuclear powered subs or surface ships. This was an anathema (is that the right word?) to Naval philosophy which regarded the operator as the final line of defense against a reactor accident. I think this is still the case. There is still considerable distrust of computerized automation in today's civilian nuclear industry. I have had to do several analog to digital, microprocessor upgrades which literally filled four or five 4-inch thick notebooks apiece just analyzing all the nuances of the software code and performing the necessary Software Hazards and Failure Analysis (that didn't include the 10 CFR 50.59 nuclear safety evaluation). The Reg. Guides and IEEE standards on this are ugly. I can give the links if you want, but this is really beyond the scope of the topic.
That being said, I think licensing unmanned civilian nuclear powered space craft would be different - maybe not easier - than licensing manned civilian nuclear powered space craft. But I feel that if one is going to all the expense to license a space craft nuclear reactor, then let's go all the way and man the craft! The financial difference between licensing a manned and an unmanned craft may not be all that different, and it's always the money that talks! When all the costs are considered nuke spacecraft could be the best financial option - but I don't have the figures to back that supposition up.
I would just like to thank you for lending us your expertise here. There are many issues involved with nuclear power in space, and licensing is just another aspect that frankly, I have not even considered until now....
As far as the physics of space propulsion systems go, anything using reaction for propulsion is by definition 'enslaved' to Konstanine Tsiokolvsky's Rocket Equation:
V=c*ln(mi/mf) where V=final velocity (velocity increment;) c=velocity of the exhaust products; mi=initial mass at start of meneuver; mf=final mass after end of meneuver.
As can be seen, to achieve a velocity increment equal to the exhaust velocity requires a mass ratio (mi/mf) equal to e or about 2.71 times the final mass. Thus we want the exhaust velocity as high as possible. Otherwise, truly gigantic rockets are required....
And this is precisely what nuclear thermal rockets and nuclear electric propulsion systems address: the need for speed is everything when it comes to exhaust velocity!
You are sincerely welcome. Your explanation of the Konstanine Tsiokolvsky's Rocket Equation is precisely why without nuclear propulsion for space craft, mankind will never be able to expand beyond the Earth-Moon cradle. As far as recommendations for licensing goes, here is what I would do:
(1) Decide on one space craft reactor design to license. A good one would be nuclear electric propulsion via a Vapor Core Reactor / Magnetohydrodynamic System. A brochure is provided by INSPI at:
I have an 8 page PDF paper entitled "Multimegawatt Nuclear Electric Propulsion with Gaseous and Vapor Core Reactors with MHD" written by Travis Knight, Samim Anghie, Blair Smith and Michaet Houts that I can e-mail on request (but I suspect you may have already read this paper).
(2) Contact the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). This is a civilian industry organization consisting of commercial nuclear power plant operators in the United States. While its focus has been the promotion the nuclear generated electricity, soliciting their help will be the only way to get the notice of the US NRC in creating a set of regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations to deal with nuclear powered space craft for civilian use. NEI documents have often morphed into NRC NUREGs and Reg. Guides, and these in turn have often paved the way for revisions to the Code of Federal Regulations. In fact, the Maintenance Rule for commercial nuclear power plants under 10 CFR 50.56 and Nuclear Safety Evaluations (called "Changes, Tests and Experiments") under 10 CFR 50.59 have been implemented and revised specifically because of NEI initiatives. Without commercial support via NEI, civilian space craft nuclear reactors will go nowhere with the US NRC simply because without an industry demand, the US NRC has NO incentive (read $$$$) to do all the work it would need to do to formulate a licensing methodology for such reactors. The NEI web page is at:
The following web page summarizes NEI's profile (which currently does NOT address space craft reactors because there is NO demand for civilian ownership / operation of such equipment - but that has to change for the US NRC to get involved).
(3) Formulate a 20 year plan to design, license, build, loft into orbit and operate a good design (such as what I mentioned above - NEP with VCR/MHD). This will have to be done by a large corporation (ugh!) because private citizens (such as Burt Rutan) have neither the financial wherewithall nor the nuclear technical resources to get the job done. NEI is a professional organization. If one doesn't come off as professional, then the door will be shut in one's face.
(4) Do a lot more research into issues facing the commercial nuclear electric industry so that you don't make the same bone-headed mistakes we have made (e.g., Fermi, Calvert Cliffs, TMI, Millstone, Davis-Besse, etc.). After the Challenger and Columbia disasters, I don't think big government has the ability to maintain a SCWE (Safety Conscious Work Environment), and big corporations such as First Energy sometimes fail misaerably at this. Space craft nuclear reactors for civilian use will never be licensed with a strong SCWE ethic - period! Some good informal message boards to participate in to get a flavor of what's going on in nuclear matters include the following:
I can't list everything here, but researching all the information from these web pages will give the interested reader a flavor of what has to be done to license nuclear propulsion units for civilian space craft, and to promote the safety of their use in the public's eyes (whose acceptance is required before government grants its permission).
I remain an ardent nuclear power supporter (obviously) and hope that my son or daughter (or their offspring) will one day be able to pilot a nuclear powered space craft from here to Titan and back.
I'm a great fan of VCR-MHD for NEP application myself, and I have met INSPI director Sam Anghaie following a presentation on Space Nuclear Power he gave at Chalk River Laboratories five years ago -- see http://www.cns-snc.ca/branches/ChalkRiver/past_speak/anghaie.htm
But I wonder -- why do you suppose INSPI hasn't already done the things you suggest in your post ? ....just 'cause they're not interested in having their design licensed under the civilian regulations of the NRC ?
.....heck, former NRC boss Nils Diaz was a colleague of Dr. Anghaie, as you mentioned earlier.
And then NASA goes and gives Prometheus to DoE NR.
Something here doesn't make a lot of sense !
Funny -- this discussion reminded me of something from a few years back: It seems that under the FAA's general aviation (GA) regulations, private owners are not supposed to have supersonic aircraft. Yet at that time, a couple of aeronautical afficianados restored an old F-105 Starfighter to top-notch flying condition, only to discover the little-known restriction. Anyhow, although I forgot the details, they eventually somehow managed to get permission to fly their Mach-2 airplane legally.....
Of course today's prospective operators of commercial suborbital 'joyride' flights are facing similar FAA licensing issues.
But getting back to the subject of this thread, let me just mention that there is plenty of civilian aircraft flying perfectly legally today, with uranium as part of their structure: its depleted uranium used as large solid metal counterweights, usually nickel-plated for corrosion protection, in a number of commercial airliner models.
To me this suggests that components of reactors could be launched into orbit without too much hassle -- as long as the enriched uranium fuel is below 20% U-235, and as long as the core is delivered in a sufficient number of flights to guarantee that in no single case is there sufficient uranium to cause criticality, under any conceivable accident situation. Also, the orbit of the assembled reactor would have to be relatively high -- to guarantee no reentry for at least a thousand years. Its not the most efficient way of doing it (I believe NASA's plan is to ensure subcriticality during delivery by using reactivity suppression devices), but it might get the job done.
As usual, excellent discussions. Thanks for the tips and the links, Paul. I will take a gander at them all.
I would just point out that the assembly of a reactor core in orbit is complicated by the fact that currently there are no fascilities to do this, in orbit. Would it not require the orbital equivalent of a a workshop to assemble the subcritical parts?
I do beleive that NASA has looked at safety devices to ensure that a fueled core cannot achieve criticality--the use of 'criticality suppression' devices, locked into place by removable pins, as well as having the control rods or drums locked into place by similar pins. This makes sense because this allows a reactor to be flown in 'safed' configuration, but still like a loaded gun with a round in the chamber, the only thing preventing it from 'switching on' are the safeties.
This is one reason why I am a proponent of using man rated boosters with a cargo verson of a crew capsule to ship the fueled core assemblies. While this is expensive, and not terribly efficient, the added protection of an extra reentry hull with its own abort/escape rocket makes sense. The weight and cost penalty of such a system more than makes up for the fact that a fully intact reactor could be recovered, probably undamaged, despite the total loss of a launch vehicle in a pad abort emergency all the way to possibly even an abort to orbit. A fully fueled core stranded in orbit could be safely deorbited and brought back to earth--without releasing a single microcurie of radioactive material. This is the kind of system which would allow the completely safe assembly of a NEP vehicle in low earth orbit.
Of course to mate the core with the rest of the vehicle will either require a space station with a crew to do the work, or clever robotic docking and manipulation systems--which isn't a bad capability to develop anyway!
....I would just point out that the assembly of a reactor core in orbit is complicated by the fact that currently there are no fascilities to do this, in orbit. Would it not require the orbital equivalent of a a workshop to assemble the subcritical parts?
That would depend on the type of reactor.
For instance, INSPI's VCR-MHD runs on gaseous uranium tetrafluoride (UF4). This stuff is a solid, white crystaline substance at room temperature, which sublimates with a little heating. I imagine that the initial fueling of a VCR-MHD would involve a sequence of injections of vaporized UF4 pellets into the core vessel, with electric trace heating ensuring that there is no cold-leg condensation happening anywhere (solid UF4, being of higher density than the vapour, could cause criticality long before all the fuel for vapour criticality is injected....).
So, in this case, you could deliver the entire assembled reactor into orbit, and then fuel it through some small gas line.
OTOH, a solid-fuel reactor like an SP-100 or Topaz-II would be considerably more difficult to fuel on-orbit. But remember that these reactors are quite small -- typically about a foot long, by foot-and-a-half diameter. That means you could assemble the core inside just about any space capsule (see for example http://www.cns-snc.ca/branches/quebec/slowpoke/Slowpoke_reactor_photos.jpg ). The hard part would be taking it out (EVA) and hooking it up to the primary heat transfer system loop, and the I&C hardware.
Some years after the Skylab space station project, I got a crazy idea for a type of space reactor that could be called a compromise between vapour-fuel and solid-fuel. The idea came to me after watching the Skylab crewmen perform fun physics demonstrations with water. In the zero-gravity environment, water formed large perfect balls, like a fortune-teller's glass ball. The astronauts then poked a straw into it and blew a bubble inside, which positioned itself concentrically with the water ball's outer surface. So I imagined that instead of water, we could have molten uranium metal (or alloy) outside in space, with a heat-exchange coil poked into its center. The fuel volume would have to be large relative to that of the HX coils, in order to minimize potentially dangerous effects on reactivity, from some inadvertent retraction of the HX coils (other design features may also be incorporated in order to address this problem). With a more benign power excursion following such an event, the overheating fuel ball might simply form a vapour bubble at its center (the hottest part) which, after sufficient growth, would reduce the core's overall equivalent density enough to shut itself down (through increased neutron leakage to space). To reduce fuel evaporation to space at high operating temperature, some sort of non-alloying, low-density, low-cost liquid material could be made to float on the surface of the uranium ball. I thought that this design could be scaled up to produce very large amounts of power -- but still in a much smaller package than the huge SPS (Solar Power Satellites) that were in vogue at the time.....
You bring up good points. However, there is a difference between 'unlicensed depleted uranium' used as large metal counterweights in aircraft and enriched uranium used in reactors. The very process of enriching uranium is regulated and controlled under 10 CFR 50 whose title is "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities". See web page http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part050/. Facilities that enrich uranium are production facilities. A brief description of such facilities in the United States may be obtained at the following web pages:
"The only gaseous diffusion plant in operation in the United States is in Paducah, Kentucky. A similar plant is near in Piketon, Ohio, but it was shut down in March 2001. Both plants are leased by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) from the Department of Energy and have been regulated by the NRC since March 4, 1997."
"No gas centrifuge commercial production plants are operating in the United States, however, both Louisiana Energy Services (LES) and USEC Inc. have submitted license applications."
Once uranium has been enriched for civilian use, it will remain under US NRC regulation no matter what its intended use may be, and regardless of the level of enrichment. In this post-9/11 world, no exceptions will be made if only because of Representive Ed Markey of Massachusettes, Representative Nita Lowey of New York, Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, Senator Hillary Clinton of New York, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, and several other liberal democrat politicians of noteriety. The importance of preventing diversion of special nuclear material from its intended use (space craft nuclear propulsion) to terrorist use has become paramount and will remain under the security regulations of 10 CFR 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials, which the interested reader may review at web page: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part073/.
In today's world of Islamic Jihaddists, stricter controls over the fabrication and use of special nuclear material for civilian purposes is even an international initiative. The interested reader may also want to review what IAEA Director ElBaradei said about this on May 2, 2005.
"...Third, we need better control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle: activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. As experience has shown, effective control of nuclear materials is the 'choke point' to preventing nuclear weapons development. Without question, improving control over facilities capable of producing weapon-usable material will go a long way towards establishing a better margin of security.
"We should be clear: there is no incompatibility between tightening controls over the nuclear fuel cycle and expanding the use of peaceful nuclear technology. In fact, by reducing the risks of proliferation, we could pave the way for more widespread use of peaceful nuclear applications..."
Yes, I realize that 20% enriched uranium used in a space craft reactor can't be used for a nuclear weapon, but that's NOT the IAEA Director's point - read on at the web link provided above....
In conclusion, licensing special nuclear material for civilian space craft propulsion regardless of the level of its enrichment will be a thorny issue indeed. No exceptions will be made on either the national or international level in a world threatened by Jihaddist fanaticism.
Yes, I realise that most radioactive substances are controlled -- some because they could potentially be used in the so-called "dirty bombs."
But my point is that its certainly possible to get a license for the ackquisition of such materials, and that the process for getting such a license is less onerous than the one for licensing a nuclear reactor.
Big difference !
Lots of companies have licenses to own & operate food irradiation facilities, manufacture of density gauges, oil well logging sources and smoke detectors, production of radiopharmaceuticals, etc., etc.
Now, granted that a license for buying and transporting low-enriched uranium (LEU - anything below 20% U-235) may be much more challenging than getting one for DU, but I don't believe that you've demonstrated that it would be equally difficult as getting one for building & operating a reactor. And I certainly wasn't implying that building enrichment plants was possible without a license.
Incidentally, DU is only license-exempt for limited quantities - 8 lbs for an unlicensed individual. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Section 40.22 reads: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has evaluated this amount of material for safety considerations and believes the risk to the public are minimal therefore, a specific license is not required.
I agree with you that licensing the civilian possession of special nuclear material for use outside Earth's orbit would likely be less onerous (by how much I don't know) than licensing the civilian possession of special nuclear material on Earth's surface.
I suspect, however, that licensing the civilian posession of special nuclear material for use within Earth's orbit would likely be as onerous as licensing the civilian possession of special nuclear material for use on Earth's surface, if only because an in-orbit accident could cause uncontrolled release of radioactive material on populated areas, or otherwise have a deleterious environmental impact once such release descends from orbit.
I can't begin to imagine what Representive Ed Markey of Massachusettes, Representative Nita Lowey of New York, Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, Senator Hillary Clinton of New York, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, and several other liberal democrat politicians of noteriety would say once they learn that a private corporation intended to build a nuclear powered space craft in orbit. The stink they would raise would be quite odiferous. You Canadians fortunately don't have quite as many politicians as irrational as many of our US ones.
Excellent catch on 10 CFR 40.22 - I forgot all about that!
--ALERT TO SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR, TEST REACTOR OFFICIALS REPORTED TO NRC and law
enforcement authorities their concerns about some individuals who repeatedly visited research reactor facilities and showed an "unusual interest in security matters." As NRC and law enforcement discovered, the visits were part of a "summer fellows" intern investigative reporter program affiliated with ABC News.
NRC says that ABC News plans to air a segment on nuclear security on all of their news shows the week before the anniversary of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. The shows include "Good Morning America," the news show "20/20," and the evening news; the segment will also be on the ABC Web site.
In a letter last month to NRC, officials from the National Organization of Test, Research & Training Reactors said that providing tours of these facilities helps to educate the public on nuclear technology and that this service should be continued. NRC responded last week that these individuals might have been covertly filming during their visits but said no safeguards information was revealed.
The Nuclear News Flash you just quoted is exactly the type of thing to set Representive Ed Markey of Massachusettes, Representative Nita Lowey of New York, Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, Senator Hillary Clinton of New York, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, and the other liberal democrat politicians in the US Congress in arms against the US NRC, crying and weeping and wailing and gnashing their teeth over 'security' concerns.
I have (as I said before) worked in nuclear power for 29 years (i.e., all my adult life). While I can't speak to the integrity of research reactors as far as security goes, I can speak about commerical nuclear power plants. We ban all photography and television equipment on site (including PDAs and cell phones with cameras) because of the possibility however remote that sensitive information would be released. Yes, everyone is searched on site entry via bomb detectors and metal detectors, and all baggage is x-rayed. All access into the site and into any site vital area is monitored via television cameras, hand geomtery readers, card readers, infra-red sensors, microwave sensors, etc. While some of our equipment is old, all is being upgraded and not even a wild turkey or a rabbit can enter the site without being detected and monitored (yes, in upstate NY we have plenty of wild animals which just love to camp out on the plant's lawns - we're quite enviro-friendly, but the goose poop is worse than my one year old son's dirty diapers! )
For information about commercial nuclear power plant security, kindly read the following web pages and relevant web links thereon:
Sadly, entrepeneurs like Burt Rutan will likely never have a chance at licensing the use of special nuclear material for space craft propulsion if only because of the fear and hysteria spread by the enviro-leftists. Big corporations and big government will retain control because only they have the resources and the financial wherewithall to deal with the ever increasing burden of regulation. While I find much to praise with the US NRC (it perhaps is the single government agency that is actually trying to do a good job), nothing grows more powerful than 'appointed public servants'.
Here at NEI, one of my colleagues came across a set of correspondence in the NRC's Adams database that was disturbing to say the least. Apparently, ABC News has been using reporter interns in an attempt to breach security at Test, Research and Training Reactors around the country.
In a July 27, 2005 letter to the NRC, Tawfik Raby and Seymour Weiss, co-chairs of the National Organization of Test, Research and Training Reactors, wrote the following to David B. Matthews, Director of the Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs in NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (click here for PDF of original letter):
Members of TRTR have identified to the NRC and law enforcement agencies the suspicious behavior of individuals who were visiting their facilities. NRC informed TRTR that these visits may have been part of a summer intern program that ABC News and other corporations were conducting related to investigative reporting.
TRTR believes that the security measures currently in place have worked and that the public health and safety have not been compromised. The research reactor community picked up on the recurrent visits by these individuals and their unusual interest in security matters very rapidly and acted accordingly.
One of the primary missions of these facilities is to inform and educate members of the public on nuclear technology matters, including school children and others. Public tours are a great asset to the community and the nation and should be continued in a prudent way. We are convinced that the TRTRs are safe and secure; however, we have urged each of our facilities to continue to be diligent and vigilant in admitting visitors and conducting tours.
Based on previous reporting and followup discussions with individual licensees, it is our understanding that these individuals did not identify themselves as intern reporters and requested tours of the facilities. In addition, at some facilities they asked numerous questions on security matters and may have been filming the tours in a covert manner. Soon after the first notification of such a visit, the NRC informed all RTR licensees of the unusual and suspicious behavior of these individuals, to anticipate such visits, and to notify law enforcement agencies and the NRC in accordance with the NRC's advisory on suspicious activities. Through prompt coordination with law enforcement, it was determined that these visits were part of a "Summer Fellows" intern investigative reporter program in conjunction with ABC News. The NRC understands that no safeguards information was available or revealed during any of these incidents.
The NRC has previously conducted comprehensive evaluations of RTR security plans, procedures, systems, and response, which included consideration of potential challenges presented by publicly-available tours and information. As a result of these earlier evaluations, the NRC concluded that RTR security continued to provide adequate protection of public health and safety. This conclusion is consistent with the findings summarized in your letter. The NRC will continue to provide oversight of RTR licensees through evaluations of safety and security at licensed facilities.
The NRC welcomes news inquiries. It is important to note that under the access authorization process for research reactors, the access afforded the Summer Fellows was the same as they would have received had they identified themselves as reporters. The NRC continues to believe that trying to gain access to reactor facilities under potentially suspicious circumstances, especially in the current threat environment, creates unnecessary concerns, diverts limited resources, and inappropriately distracts from high priority law enforcement activities.
For some people, it might be easy to forget that Americans are under threat from terrorism, but not the nuclear industry. Security of nuclear facilities is serious business. It isn't a game, and ABC News ought to know better.