NRC STAFF ISSUES GENERIC LETTER ON ELECTRIC GRID RELIABILITY IMPACT ON PLANT RISK Printable Version
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has issued a Generic Letter asking all U.S. nuclear power plant operators for additional information on how they continue to ensure the reliability of offsite electrical power sources and how they continue to comply with NRC regulations on maintaining offsite power to safety-related systems.
The blackout of Aug. 14, 2003, caused nine U.S. nuclear power plants to shut down. Similar to non-nuclear facilities, when the grid is lost or significantly degraded, the protective circuits of the nuclear reactor and the turbine generator automatically shut down the plant to protect equipment. Nuclear facilities are designed with backup power sources, typically emergency diesel generators, to provide power to essential safety systems. During the blackout, diesel generators kept the nine plants in a safe condition.
The NRC’s review of the events surrounding the blackout raised several issues, including how plants prearrange for backup power from local sources and how they monitor the grid in real time. Plant operators have 60 days from the issuance of the Letter to submit written responses to questions in several areas, including:
– Arrangements between the plants and grid system operators or reliability coordinators, to monitor the grid’s ability to provide power to a plant’s safety systems;
– Arrangements for system operators to assist plants in considering grid conditions for assessing risks related to performing grid-risk sensitive maintenance; and,
– Procedures in place for identifying local power sources that could assist the plant when normal offsite power is unavailable.
A draft letter was published for comment in the Federal Register on April 12, 2005, and responses were incorporated into the final document. The NRC’s Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards reviewed the Generic Letter in November 2005. In January, the NRC staff also held a public meeting with nuclear power plant licensees, grid operators, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and other interested stakeholders to discuss the letter.
I always thought that it was somewhat ironic that a big nuclear power plant must rely on diesel backup generators for emergency shutdowns in during a black out--but such are the necessities of technology. It is interesting that pressurized water reactors--and most nuclear reactors in general--must preheat the coolant water generally using electricity to bring the coolant up to a minimal operating temperature--before the reactor core is even allowed to 'go critical' and begin generating heat.
The pressurizer in PWR's uses a bank of resistance heaters--kind of a gigantic version of a house's hot water heater--to heat some of the water to the point that it boils and creates some trapped steam in the head space of a confined vessel. Pressure is transmitted from the bottom of this vessel to the main coolant inlet lines going to the core (or is it the hot return lines--I don't remember!) Anyways, the point is, that a 'cold start' of a nuclear reactor is kind of a misnomer--and most plants when they start are initially large "loads" on the electrical grid before they come up to operating power. These diesel backup generators do not generate enough power to start a reactor (in a cold start condition where the coolant has been allowed to cool to ambient temperature--such as after a refueling operation or such.) Only by connecting a nuclear powerplant to an energized grid will the plant recieve enough power to actually commence operation--before it can generate any.
How many Megawatts does it take to "Cold Start" a nuclear power plant?
That reminds me of one big problem with my space fusion propusion ideas. Even if you have a concept that will both sustain itself and provide thrust once its running, how do us start that darn thing!!??
Commercial boiling water reactors can actually perform a cold start, i.e., they can go critical at below 200 F and use reactor heat to raise RCS temperature and pressure to normal operating levels.
Submarine pressurized water reactors can also perform a cold start and use reactor heat to raise RCS temperature and pressure to normal operating levels.
The reason why commercial pressurized water reactors cannot do this is because they use boric acid as a means of controlling reactivity. When RCS temperature is below 200 F, the temperature co-efficient of reactivity in a commercial PWR tends to be slightly positive due to the neutronic effects of boron - cold water, higher density, more boron atoms per unit volume - thus, when temperature rises, distance between boron atoms increases and the chances that a neutron will escape capture by boron increases, thus making more neutrons available for fission, thus introducing a positive reactivity effect. This does not occur at normal operating temperatures and pressures because the macroscopic cross-section for neutron scattering from the light hydrogen in water ends up 'outweighing' the macroscopic cross-section for neutron absorption in boron. That inverse relationship causes a net negative temperature co-efficient of reactivity.
Submarine PWRs do not use chemical shim of core reactivity. Commercial BWRs use two methods of controlling core reactivity: control rod movement and variation in reactor water recirculation flowrate. Both submarine PWRs and commercial BWRs tend to have very strong negative temperature co-efficients of reactivity, even at low temperatures and pressures. Because boric acid reactivity shim is used in commercial PWRs, this is not the case and PWR startup below normal operating temperatures and pressures is forbidden.
I would be very curious to learn from Jaro what is permitted for Candu reactors which are quite dissimilar from submarine PWRs, commercial PWRs and commercial BWRs.
First of all, are you sure that stuff about nuke sub reactors is public domain ? (you might want to consider going back & editing it out of your message, before you get into trouble...).
As regards CANDU reactors, all our reactivity controlls - and there are several types - are carried out on the moderator side, which, as you know, is un-pressurized low temperature (~80 C) D2O. We do use a small amount of boron, on new reactors with a fresh load of natural uranium fuel, to suppress the excess reactivity (there is also a reactivity shim system using "liquid rods" of light water, but this is insufficient to handle the reactivity of a full core load of fresh fuel). But once in steady-state on-line refuelling operation, the boron is removed.
Having ~5 times less U235 in the fuel than PWRs, means that there is far less excess reactivity to deal with in CANDUs.
For emergency shutdown, in addition to the shutdown rods, there is a Gadolinium nitrate injection system. On older designs, there was a system for simply dumping the moderator out of the calandria, but this is no longer used, since its considered to be not fast enough, and because it eliminates a desirable heat sink, in case of a beyond-design-basis accident...
PS. Up here the joke is that PWRs are "pumping boron," instead of water (with particular reference to the Davis Besse incident).
Thanks for the clarification, Paul. I forgot about Boiling Water Reactors! And yes, it stands to reason that a naval PWR ought to be able to undergo a cold start--it sure wouldn't make much sense to put a power source onboard a ship that was incapable of being started by onboard diesel auxiliary power! The Navy generally doesn't roll out 10,000 mile long extension cords to connect a nuclear vessel to shore power! ;)
I think the Navy tends to shy away from 'chemical shims' because of corrosion concerns. Corrosion inside the cooling system of a nuclear sub could be real bad news--I wonder how the Russians have dealt with this problem in their Naval reactors...?
Anyway, that's a bit off topic. It's interesting to understand that there is a certain minimum level of power needed to start a power plant. I remember taking a tour of our PG&E Humboldt Bay Power Station, which has two fossil fuel (natural gas primary, oil secondary) fired boilers, Units 1 and 2, while unit 3 is an old General Electric Boiling Water Reactor of about 65MW. Unit 3 has been shut down since 1976, and was one of the very first commercial nuclear reactors to be decommisioned in the United States. Any how, I remember seeing a large bank of lead acid batteries in a room predictably called the "Battery Room." Now what on Earth would a power plant need batteries for? The Engineer who was giving the tour smiled and said basically that incase of a major power disruption--something that required the plant to completely shut down--which has never happened yet--then the only way to 'cold start' the plant was to provide enough initial electricity to run certain pumps, control circuits, and ingiters to get the initial fires started again. Once those boilers came up, in something less than an hour the steam turbines would begin to spin again. Although he said the batteries were something of a 'throwback' they still kept them because '...you never know when they might be needed..." Still, even a modest diesel backup generator supplying 100 kW could easily displace the batteries for any contigency. I can only imagine how big the backup generators are at a large commercial nuke plant is--probably several megawatts just to run the emergency backup coolant pumps.
This indeed is in the public domain. I was surprised at the wealth of information that is now available in the public domain simply by entering the words "nuclear submarine reactor startup" in the Yahoo or Google search engines.
That *is* an interesting article -- not least for those of us interested in nuclear space propulsion: As you may recall, the startup sequence for the NERVA-ROVER nuclear thermal rockets was waaay faster, and going to far higher power too. And that included the turbine startup for the LH2 pump -- although that turbine was of course much smaller than the nuke sub turbine driving the electric generator....